Rochester Institute of Technology

RIT Scholar Works
Theses
9-11-2022

Understanding the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and
Explosive (CBRNE) Defense Policy Making Process Through
Historical and Current Event Analysis
Michaela Christine Mesiti
mcm3904@rit.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses

Recommended Citation
Mesiti, Michaela Christine, "Understanding the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive
(CBRNE) Defense Policy Making Process Through Historical and Current Event Analysis" (2022). Thesis.
Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses by an authorized administrator of RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact
ritscholarworks@rit.edu.

Understanding the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and
Explosive (CBRNE) Defense Policy Making Process Through Historical
and Current Event Analysis
By
Michaela Chrisine Mesiti

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science
In Science, Technology and Public Policy

Department of Public Policy
College of Liberal Arts

Rochester Institute of Technology
Rochester, New York
September 11, 2022

I

Understanding the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and
Explosive (CBRNE) Defense Policy Making Process Through Historical
and Current Event Analysis

Table of Contents
Abstract

1

Introduction

2

Motivation

3

Literature Review
Security Council 1373
Geneva Protocol
Biodefense Summit
Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism
Table 1: Historical Examples of CBRNE Warfare, from Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: a
Historical Review by Stefan Riedel [9]
Table 2: Examples of Biological Warfare During World War II, from Biological Warfare and
Bioterrorism: a Historical Review by Stefan Riedel [9]
Literature Evaluation

4
5
6
6
7
8
9
9

Theory
Policy Models
Figure 1: Linear Model of Policymaking from Policy Models (Lasswell, Meier) [11]
Figure 2: Policy Streams Model from Policy Models (Kingdon) [11]
Proposed Hypothesis

13
13
14
16
16

Methods
Case Studies
Analysis and Parameters
Table 3: Case Studies by Type

17
17
19
19

Results
Incidents at Dugway Proving Ground
Operation Warp Speed
Attitudes Towards Foreign Use of CBRNE
Biotechnology Policies
National Strategy for CBRNE Standards
Analytical Results
Table 4: Case Study Results Summary, by year of occurrence, for CBRNE Policies
Table 5: Case Study Results Summary, by year of occurrence, for Technological Innovation
Policies

20
20
21
22
26
27
28
29

II

31

Table 6: Case Study Results Summary, by year of occurrence, for Both CBRNE and
Technological Innovation Policies
32
Table 7: Foreign Affairs Influence by Case Type
33
Table 8: Proactivity by Case Type
33
Figure 3: Results of CBRNE versus Non-CBRNE Policies/Actions Influenced by Foreign Affairs
34
Figure 4: Results of CBRNE versus Non-CBRNE Policies/Actions Proactivity
35
Figure 5: Results of CBRNE versus Non-CBRNE Policies/Actions following Policy Models 36
Discussion

36

Conclusion

38

Timeline

40

Committee Members

41

References:

42

III

Abstract
Understanding Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE)
defense policies is critical in promoting safety to civilian and military personnel in the United
States and globally. This thesis first examines a few of the most significant CBRNE policies in
history, their place in the world today, and how their creation has impacted society. Utilizing two
canonical policy making models– the “linear model” and the “policy stream model”– a range of
case studies are analyzed to examine how decision-making behind CBRNE policy compares with
other comparable policy domains, particularly non-CBRNE biotechnology innovation. The
likelihood of proactivity and the potential influence of foreign affairs across cases were assessed.
The results of these studies suggest that, compared with non-CBRNE biotechnology policies,
CBRNE policies in the United States are similarly likely to be driven by foreign events
(approximately half the time in the cases examined), but they were slightly more likely to be
reacting to external events rather than proactively addressing possible risks (43% of CBRNE
cases examined were proactive, compared to 50% of biotechnology cases). These suggestive
patterns merit further research to test whether they hold over a wider scope of cases.
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Introduction
With constantly evolving innovation in science and technology, the threat of a CBRNE
(Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives) event remains significant. Just in
the twenty-first century alone, major CBRNE events such as the Anthrax Incident (2001), the
Syrian Civil War (2013) and the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020) have taken the lives of people all
over the globe. Biodefense policy examines actions designed to reduce risks, prepare for,
respond to, recover from, and counter biological threats and bioincidents [1].
Despite the growing importance of CBRNE threats, comparatively little attention has
been given to how policies are created to address these threats. Are CBRNE defense policies
created similarly to other technological innovation policies that develop over time, or are they
affected more by foreign events outside of the United States? This analysis will work to examine
first, if CBRNE defense policies are created in a similar process to other biological/chemical
technologies or not. The idea that CBRNE policies are affected by external events such as
international policies, international procedures, or international pressures will also be explored,
as well as proactiveness of policies and policy-making models.
Research for this thesis explored the relationship between CBRNE events, policies, and
innovation of related biological technologies. The results of the case study analyses indicate that
CBRNE policies are affected by foreign affairs–but no more so than other technological
innovation policies. However, CBRNE policies are particularly likely to be reactive to events
rather than proactive. These conclusions provide an important baseline of knowledge regarding
CBRNE defense policy that should be considered for future research. These findings also
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emphasize the need to consider a more proactive approach to trying to protect citizens from the
growing threat of a CBRNE event that is faced daily by people globally.
Motivation
An analysis of CBRNE policies is important to risk management for the future. With data
and knowledge more available than ever, the threat of a CBRNE attack remains at a significantly
high level and the difficulty for attackers lessens with time.
Life in a modern society promotes itself to certain precautions and actions being taken by
government and military to protect soldiers and civilians from CBRNE attacks. Understanding
how policy fits into this is critical for understanding the past, present, and future of CBRNE.
How can the United States’ approaches change to be more effective?
The use of CBRNE weaponry is not a new concept. Toxic weapons were described as
being used in the Trojan War by Homer in the Iliad around twelve hundred BCE. Beyond that,
it’s said that Mongols used to catapult dead bodies contaminated with a plague towards their
enemies, forcing them to retreat in the mid fourteenth century [2]. It’s no secret that CBRNE was
a harsh reality of warfare during World War One. Tear gas, chlorine gas, chloropicrin shells,
mustard gas, and anthrax spores were used by multiple nations against their enemies [2].
Though horrific, this major event led to the arguably most famous policy regarding
CBRNE defense. The Geneva Protocol, more properly known as the Geneva Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, was signed on June seventeenth, nineteen hundred twenty five [2].
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Why then, if the idea of CBRNE defense use has been around for centuries, does it still
hold to be such an unknown area of research to the public eye? From an early age, humans are
taught to fear the unknown, to avoid the things that could hurt us. CBRNE warfare is certainly
that… unknown to the general public and certainly harmful. But CBRNE is different, because it
is dealing with pathogens, with cells that are alive, that can infect humans without them even
knowing.
Take the Anthrax Event of two thousand and one that sent the United States into mass
hysteria. Five deaths and seventeen illnesses took place because letters laced with anthrax were
being sent via the United States mail service. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
“the ensuing investigation by the FBI and its partners - code-named ‘Amerithrax’ - has been one
of the largest and most complex in the history of law enforcement” [3].
But CBRNE cannot be unknown to everybody. Many people study the field and even
further, governments and militaries conduct research regularly on CBRNE defense. Surely it
cannot be unknown to them as well. Government policies and regulations can admittedly be
difficult to find for somebody in the general public, which for security reasons, is probably a
good thing. That being said, attitudes towards CBRNE can often be seen in the news following
specific events. Unfortunately, there is not much scholarly literature regarding the attitudes of
governments towards CBRNE defense. This thesis aims to make connections between CBRNE
events, policies, and innovation of other biological technologies.
Literature Review
This research begins with an examination of the history of CBRNE defense and related
guidelines. The parameters of proactiveness and foreign influence will be focused upon in
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following sections to further develop the idea of their impact on how and why a policy is
fabricated relating to CBRNE defense.
Security Council 1373

The International Legal Framework against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Terrorism was created by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. This is a
publicly available document that includes numerous implementation procedures for CBRNE
security. Security Council resolution 1373 (as part of this framework) was adopted after the
terrorist attacks of September eleven, two thousand one [4], making this a non-proactive policy
that came after the CBRNE event. “The resolution notes with concern the close connection
between international terrorism and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other
potentially deadly materials and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of
efforts on national subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global
response to this serious challenge and threat to international security” [4].
Security Council resolution 1373, as part of the International Legal Framework against
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism, highlights ways in which states can
prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, requirements aimed to prevent terrorist acts,
ways to bring terrorists to justice and to deal with international cooperation measures [4]. It can
be inferred that these regulations provided states with new ways in which to mitigate the risks
associated with CBRNE terrorism and events.
Section 4.3 (Implementation of the International Legal Instruments Against CBRN
Terrorism) highlights the importance of implementation of CBRNE policy instruments [4].
Though the United Nations has created these guidelines, if nationals do not implement and adopt
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these guidelines, they become ineffective. This is an interesting point because the risk
management does not lie in the hands of the policy makers, but in the hands of the people they
affect. This is a crucial point to risk mitigation and protection of society from CBRNE events.
Safety here goes beyond the policy maker.
Geneva Protocol

The Geneva Protocol was signed on seventeen June nineteen hundred twenty five by the
League of Nations and it established a protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gasses, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. This is an
early example of CBRNE defense policy. The protocol states that the use of chemical and
biological warfare is prohibited for use by the civilized world [5]. Thirty eight states originally
signed the Protocol, France being the first. As of April twenty twenty-one, one hundred forty six
states have become an included party [6].
Biodefense Summit

In two thousand nineteen, the United States Department of Health and Human Services
published a Biodefense Summit Transcript given by Robert Kadlec. At the time, Kadlec was the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response [7]. The transcript highlights many CBRNE
events in United States history, some of which are below.
In the Revolutionary War, George Washington ordered the variolation of the Continental
Army to protect the American soldiers from a smallpox epidemic in New England [7]. In
eighteen hundred sixty three, during the American Civil War, a confederate physician was
incarcerated for importing clothing from smallpox and yellow fever patients and selling them to
Union Soldiers [8]. Later in the future, President Dwight D. Eisenhower was forced to change his
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CBRNE strategy from deterrence to prevention in nineteen fifty six due to an experiment at
Dugway Proving Ground in which a group of soldiers were infected with brucella on a simulated
battlefield. Following, also in nineteen fifty six, President Eisenhower advised a biodefense
policy in order for the United States to be prepared to use bioweapons in a manner that would be
advantageous [7]. Similarly, before President Richard Nixon left office, he issued Executive
Order 11490. This tasked the Secretary of Health and Education Welfare with the responsibility
of developing chemical and biological defenses for America [7].
Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism

Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: a Historical Review by Stefan Riedel includes
multiple different tables important to this analysis development. Table 1 gives examples of
biological and chemical warfare use during the past two thousand years. Some highlights from
this include the seventeen hundred sixty three use by British colonists to Native Americans, the
American Civil War, World War One and World War Two [9]. Table 2 gives examples of
biological warfare programs during World War Two, which included the use by the United States
of chemical herbicides and Anthrax [9].
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Table 1: Historical Examples of CBRNE Warfare, from Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: a
Historical Review by Stefan Riedel [9]
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Table 2: Examples of Biological Warfare During World War II, from Biological Warfare and
Bioterrorism: a Historical Review by Stefan Riedel [9]

Literature Evaluation

Policies such as the Geneva Protocol, were put in place to prevent CBRNE events, but
yet have been broken globally plenty of times, specifically in the cases of the Holocaust (1941)
and Italy’s invasion of Ethopia (mid-1930s) [10]. In these cases, the preventative policy may not
have been effective in stopping the CBRNE event. Adversary leaders still launched CBRNE
attacks, in violation of the Geneva Protocol.
Security Council Resolution 1373 was created in two thousand one following the terrorist
attacks of September eleventh [4]. This is a non-proactive policy that resulted from a CBRNE
terror event.
From the analysis, it is clear that proactive CBRNE policies have not been entirely
successful at preventing CBRNE attacks. This is clear by the literature presented regarding the
Geneva Protocol, instances of violating the Geneva Protocol, evolution of the biodefense policy,
and the history of CBRNE agents. Oftentimes, CBRNE policies are non-proactive in nature,
9

happening after the event has taken place. This can be seen in the literature presented regarding
the United Nations Legal Framework and the transcript from the United States Department of
Health and Human Services.
The International Legal Framework against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear Terrorism, as created by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is an important
document for CBRNE policy standardization and implementation. The Security Council
resolution 1373 provided new ways for governments to mitigate CBRNE risks and Section 4.3 of
the document gave guidelines for implementation which show that safety goes beyond the
original policy maker [4].
This entire module is very detailed and deliberate in providing the legal/policy
background in which the United Nations follows. This makes it an exceptionally useful
document when studying standards. The document also makes it clear that the risk management
for CBRNE does not lie in the hands of the policy makers, but in the hands of the people that the
policies affect, for they are the ones who are implementing. This is a crucial point to risk
mitigation and protection of society from CBRNE threats. As an important critique with this
piece of literature; it is published by the United Nations (unodc.org), a credible government
source, yet includes the statement, “This publication has not been formally edited” [4]. This
leads one to further question the review process that these guidelines are going through before
publication.
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 declares, “...this prohibition shall be universally accepted
as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and practice of nations” [5]. This is a
bold claim made in the document, but questions remain. How can this be true if many nations
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across the globe aren’t signatories and the protocol continues to be under the possibility of
violation?
Though the Geneva Protocol was held as one of the first international CBRNE policies, it
has been violated a number of times since nineteen hundred twenty five. Adolf Hitler violated
the Geneva Protocol during World War Two when he used hydrogen cyanide (Zyklon B) in place
of water in showers to kill prisoners in his concentration camps. In the mid-nineteen hundred
thirties, Italian soldiers used mustard gas in aerial raids against adversaries, civilians, and
medical personnel in their invasion of Ethiopia under the leadership of Benito Mussolini.
The presidential legislatures outlined in the Evolution of Biodefense Policy transcript are
significant because they promote the collection of CBRNE weapons by the United States, which
may be seen as contradictory to the Geneva Protocol and other related policies. As a critique of
this reading, it is not a peer-reviewed journal article, but the author is a well-known expert on the
topic and qualified to give information. The source also does not provide much purpose behind
the transcript or why the summit was taking place.
Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: a Historical Review by Stefan Riedel is overall a
very resourceful piece of literature. It is a peer-reviewed journal article written by an assumed
expert. The article gives a clear abstract, motivation, and recommendations for further
presentation and research. The literature also recommends that the medical community and
public further educate themselves on CBRNE threats [9].
Throughout history, the United States has used CBRNE as both an offensive and
defensive strategy. This is best presented in the transcript provided by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services. It’s important to note that in an offensive frame,
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CBRNE weapons can be very successful in accomplishing a goal. In a defensive frame, CBRNE
agents can be nearly impossible to defend against. And in the frame of the victim, CBRNE
attacks can be devastating.
Many CBRNE policies regarding warfare/terrorism are non-proactive, as is seen in the
policies following September 11th, 2001. Proactive and preventative measures are usually
created on a smaller scale, in examples such as in regard to workplace safety. The Geneva
Protocol is an example of a preventative policy measure that is larger in scale, as it is recognized
internationally.
More specifically, risk management in the United States in the area of CBRNE defense
has changed over time, having used CBRNE both offensively and defensively. There have been
events in which a window of opportunity presented itself to adversaries due to vulnerabilities in
policy and readiness. Policies related to CBRNE and biological technology that were studied
here are able to be traced into following certain policy models. Though created at different times
in history, by different people, under different circumstances, they tend to follow specific
patterns into fruition. Two of these models can be found in the Theory section, and how policies
such as the Geneva Protocol and Security Council 1373 fit into them.
In general, CBRNE events and policies have contributed to the United States’ risk and
casualty mitigation strategies. Whether offensively or defensively, CBRNE mechanisms can be
successful in achieving the goals of a nation. These goals could be to either protect its citizens by
prevention or protect their citizens by reaction. As stated previously, many CBRNE policies
regarding warfare/terrorism are the opposite of proactive in nature, meaning that the policy is
created in response to an event taking place. Evaluating the literature above also alludes to the
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idea that CBRNE defense policy in the United States historically tends to be influenced on some
level by foreign affairs. This will be expanded upon in further detail later in this thesis.
Theory
Policy Models

Policy models are important to understand when attempting to create a framework for
policy implementation. They are included in this analysis to show that both CBRNE and
non-CBRNE policies are created in similar ways, and their processes can be mapped out
similarly using these models. For this analysis, four different examples of policies were analyzed
and related back to the policy models. Their relation was conditional on a policy actually
occurring, rather than a recommendation or action. These are outlined below and in the results
section. Understanding these policy models and their effects on CBRNE defense is important to
realizing how and why these policies are implemented.
The linear model of policymaking describes a process in which policy makers predict and
prescribe an issue that they believe is to be addressed by a regulation, make a policy decision,
and then the new policy is implemented with an outcome to be discovered in the future. It’s
understood that the policy makers would usually take either a society-centered focus or a
state-centered focus. This linear model of policymaking was coined by Lasswell in 1951 and
further developed by Meier in 1991 [11].
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Figure 1: Linear Model of Policymaking from Policy Models (Lasswell, Meier) [11]

Based on case study analysis, it can be said that the Geneva Protocol is an example of the
linear policy making model. Following World War I, many world leaders recognized the great
danger that biological and chemical warfare would inflict on people all over the world. The
international community was suddenly very aware of the “human-inflicted mass destruction
[12]” that was possible. Therefore, at the Geneva Conference of nineteen hundred twenty five,
the League of Nations developed what was to be known as the Geneva Protocol. A choice was
made at the convention and the policy was implemented by its signatories [12]. This, therefore, is
a clear representation of the linear model of policy making.
A similar policy development approach was also taken regarding the regulation of
biotechnology for use in non-warfare contexts. In nineteen hundred eighty six, President Ronald
Reagan approved the release of the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology. This was expected to reduce public concerns as it was to “ensure a consistent
Federal Government approach” to biotechnology [13]. According to the Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library and Museum, this framework came about as a reformulated approach to the
nineteen hundred eighty four framework due to public comments of concern [13]. The Office of
14

Science and Technology Policy highlights this in their twenty-six June nineteen hundred eighty
six framework publication. “Of the comments FDA received on the policy statement, most
favored the policy statement; some requested further clarification and guidance. The current
action constitutes FDA’s final policy statement which has been revised in response to the
comments” [14].
Reagan’s Framework for Biotechnology can also be said to have followed a linear model
of policymaking as described by Lasswell and Meier [11]. The administration recognized the
need for a more detailed policy following comments from the framework released in nineteen
hundred eighty four. Considering both the interests of the state and the public, the Reagan
Administration made a policy choice to republish a biotechnology framework and implement it
into participating agencies, including Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, the
Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Food and Drug
Administration, among others [14].
As stated above, Security Council Resolution 1373 put the responsibility of CBRNE
safety in the hands of the user, rather than the policy maker. This is significant because it shows
the government’s involvement and attitude towards CBRNE policy. Security Council Resolution
1373 can be said to have been formed out of a policy window, as coined by Kingdon’s Policy
Streams Model [11]. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 gave way to a “Problem
Stream,” a desire for a more centralized military approach [15] gave way to a “Politics Stream,”
and reliance on military efforts of enforcement [15] gave way to a “Policy Stream.”
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Figure 2: Policy Streams Model from Policy Models (Kingdon) [11]

This section of the thesis aimed to explore CBRNE policies and how their
implementation follows existing models in literature. Models such as these are used for analysis
in a variety of industries because they explicitly and deliberately convey a process. In this
journey of discovering how and why CBRNE policies are created, this model-based approach
seems critical in acknowledging, as it provides a recognized, secondary parameter to examine in
conjunction with the primary parameters of proactiveness and foreign influence.
Proposed Hypothesis

Are CBRNE defense policies created similarly to the technological innovation policies
that develop over time, are they affected by external events outside of the United States, or are
they affected by a combination of these? This analysis will work to examine first, if CBRNE
defense policies are created in a similar fashion to other biological/chemical technologies or not.
If the processes are different, the idea that CBRNE policies are affected by external events such
as international policies, international procedures, or international pressures will be explored.
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It is hypothesized that American CBRNE policies are non-proactive in nature upon initial
implementation, as they are created as a response to a specific CBRNE event. This idea will be
explored through case study analysis of CBRNE policies, the events surrounding them, and
historical timelines. Policies were studied in both the CBRNE and technological innovation
fields to determine if the majority of policies could be considered proactive or not.
It is hypothesized that American CBRNE policies are affected by international external
factors. This is inferred based upon research of policies, military operations, policy models,
overseas tactics, and other related concepts. Research for the literature review found a lot of
cases of policies from the United Nations. With China and Russia being continuous threats to the
United States and the free world, it is inferred that CBRNE policies in these countries would be
most likely to influence American policies.
Methods
Many CBRNE policies regarding warfare/terrorism are the opposite of proactive, in that
the event happens before a policy is created. Proactive and preventative measures are taken
usually on a smaller scale, regarding the workplace, etc..
Case Studies

Through case study analysis, relationships were determined between CBRNE defense
strategies, public attitudes, and the policies made regarding them. The first of which was to
determine how specific CBRNE policies were established using various models of policy
making. From there, a case study was done regarding Dugway Proving Ground and its
operations, including Bellwether, Big Itch, and accidental anthrax shipments. Also included is an
analysis of the attitudes taken by the United States Federal Government with regards to the use
17

of CBRNE defense tactics overseas. Specifically studied here are the two thousand thirteen use
of chemical weapons in Syria and President Obama’s response, as well as the two thousand
twenty two threat of chemical weapons in Ukraine and President Biden’s response. Operation
Warp Speed and the FDA’s 510(k) and Emergency Use Authorization implementation during the
COVID-19 Pandemic was also studied.
Research was conducted first by branching off of the above literature review. The general
internet was searched as well as the Rochester Institute of Technology Wallace Library Database,
and Google Scholar. A large portion of the start of the results section can be attributed to
coursework practiced with Dr. Nathan Claes, in the Rochester Institute of Technology course
entitled Readings in Public Policy. It was then that policy models were discussed and learned,
and this was used as the basis for the methodologies sections of the results.
Also used heavily in case study research were federal government websites such as those
attributed to the White House, past presidential administrations, military bases, and government
libraries. Additionally many news articles were examined to determine specific events and
feelings regarding certain events to aid in case study analysis.
An in-depth study was conducted on Presidential speeches and interviews as well. Many
hours were spent watching and rewatching videos after a search of “Obama on chemical
weapons,” “Obama on bio innovation.” The same tactics and methodologies were conducted in
regards to President Biden. Many videos were also viewed regarding CBRNE accidents on
American military bases, which came about from a brief search of the United States’ use of
CBRNE.
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Analysis and Parameters

Overall, thirteen different policies and reactions were studied regarding CBRNE and
technological innovations. The results of the study were then summarized in tables and graphs.
These figures show the differences in policies and how they contribute to the overall consensus
of the paper.
In all of the research done, the thirteen different policies studied were chosen based on
three parameters. These parameters helped to establish dependent variables among cases and
create a limited scope. The cases to be chosen first had to be policies or actions created by the
United States government. The cases also had to be either related to CBRNE or to biological or
chemical innovations. Lastly, the cases had to be policies or actions that occurred within the last
two centuries. Though not intentional, none of the policies/actions studied are more than one
hundred years old.
Table 3: Case Studies by Type
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Type of Cases

Number of Cases Studied

CBRNE Only Type

7

CBRNE and Technological Innovation

2

Technological Innovation Only

4

Total

13

Results
Incidents at Dugway Proving Ground

An incident in two thousand sixteen and the United States’ government response
demonstrates once again the attitude towards CBRNE safety. Let us go back a few years. As
previously noted, CBRNE defense tactics were utilized greatly in World War One. So as World
War Two approached, the United States was in search of a place in which they could easily test
protective equipment and powerful weapons. And thus, in a remote area of the Utah desert,
Dugway Proving Ground was established in nineteen forty two [16]. Many things took place
over the years at Dugway and other related United States testing locations. Investigating these
incidents helps to provide contextual evidence for United States attitudes towards CBRNE
defense tactics used domestically.
Operation Bellwether included multiple tests and experiments regarding the use of
mosquitos as weapons in the nineteen fifties. Similarly, Operation Big Itch tested if fleas could
be a viable use of entomological warfare against the Japanese [15]. Presently, Dugway seems to
boast an interesting mix of being both very hidden from, and very visible to the public eye. It is
situated on about eight hundred acres of remote desert, yet hosts events for the local Utah
community as well. On March first, twenty twenty two, Dugway celebrated its eightieth
anniversary of operation [17].
But Dugway didn’t always follow the most regimented procedures to ensure policy
standards were met. On January fifteenth, two thousand sixteen, The New York Times reported
that Brigadier General William E. King IV, who commanded Dugway for two years beginning in
two thousand nine, had allowed almost two hundred other laboratories to receive shipments of
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live anthrax from the Proving Ground. An initial review by the Pentagon concluded that the
problems were mostly procedural and showed that insufficient testing was done to conclude that
the anthrax samples were no longer alive and harmful [18].
It is from these examples that an attitude towards CBRNE testing can be determined.
Dugway was established as a way for the United States to safely and securely test CBRNE
defense tactics. Although the centralized government was involved, the safety remained largely
in the hands of the people that were on the ground. In most cases, that is/was enough for the
nation. But on rare occasions, safety was compromised, as such with the anthrax shipment issue
by Brigadier General King IV.
There was no new policy emergence from the events that occurred at Dugway. In looking
at Kingdon’s Policy Streams Model, it can be said that the live anthrax incident was a Problem
Stream, but neither a Policy Stream nor a Politics Stream occurred here, so a Policy Window was
not opened. It’s interesting to see that the United States has been quite adamant in implementing
policies in regards to others’ use of CBRNE, but made little policy efforts when one of their own
released dangerous anthrax.
Operation Warp Speed

In this analysis, it’s also important to look at how CBRNE defense policies are created in
the United States. In the example of Operation Warp Speed, Kingdon’s Policy Streams Model
can be applied here. The COVID-19 Pandemic began in February 2020 when the SARS-CoV-2
virus infected and spread throughout the globe [19]. Operation Warp Speed was developed
during the Trump Administration and it aimed “to deliver 300 million doses of a safe, effective
vaccine for COVID-19 by January 2021, as part of a broader strategy to accelerate the
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development, manufacturing, and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics, and
diagnostics” [20].
Operation Warp Speed is an example of Kingdon’s Policy Stream model because it
resulted due to a Problem Stream, Policy Stream, and Politics Stream. After the COVID-19
Pandemic had begun, many lives were being lost, the economy was suffering, and infections
were rising tremendously [19]. The COVID-19 Pandemic is the “Problem Stream.” Vaccines
would typically have to go through a long and detailed process of testing in order to gain FDA
approval to be used by the public. In this case, so many people were dying that the policies
needed to be changed for the emergency situation. This issue would be the “Policy Stream.” For
Operation Warp Speed to work, it also took cooperation and teamwork between different
government agencies and private companies (that were manufacturing the vaccine). The
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Defense rolled out Operation
Warp Speed together [20]. This teamwork and coordination would be the “Politics Stream.”
Security Council Resolution 1373 and Operation Warp Speed would both be considered
CBRNE policies in the United States that came about in a way that mirrors Kingdon’s Policy
Window Model. The Live Anthrax incident at Dugway Proving Ground would be an example of
an event that created a “Problem Stream,” but due to a lack of a “Policy Stream” and “Politics
Stream,” a Policy Window was never opened.
Attitudes Towards Foreign Use of CBRNE

Shifting gears now to international affairs and America’s attitude towards them, the thesis
will examine first the Obama Administration’s, followed by the Biden Administration’s
responses to the use of CBRNE globally. According to the United States Department of State, “...
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on the early morning of August 21, 2013, the Assad regime released the nerve agent sarin on its
own people in the Ghouta district of Damascus, killing more than 1,400 Syrians, many of them
children” [21]. In the age of technology and social media, photos and videos of these victims
traveled around the world. It was a horrific sight to be seen and many were saddened.
On September tenth, two thousand and thirteen, President Barack Obama addressed
Americans regarding the conflict in Syria. Regarding the August twenty first incident, he said,
“On that terrible night, the world saw in gruesome detail the terrible nature of chemical weapons,
and why the overwhelming majority of humanity has declared them off-limits – a crime against
humanity, and a violation of the laws of war” [22]. Obama references the 1997 agreement
approved by the United States Senate that prohibits the use of chemical weapons for “98 percent
of humanity” [22]. The speech continues to explain that these rules were indisputably broken and
Assad’s behavior was unacceptable.
According to National Public Radio (npr), President Obama said previously in 2012 that
the use of chemical weapons in Syria would not be tolerated, and famously uttered that the then
theoretical event would be “a red line for us” [23]. But, in the September speech described
above, after the attack had occurred, Obama urged that Congress should authorize any military
action taken. There seemed to be little support in Congress for military intervention, and the
United States never took direct action in Syria under Obama’s leadership [23].
“We’ll restore science to its rightful place” President Obama spoke in his two thousand
nine Inaugural Address. But what did this mean? What is science’s “rightful place?” According
to The Obama White House, it was “a strong commitment to basic and applied research,
innovation, and education, … restoring integrity to science policy, … and making decisions on
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the basis of evidence, rather than ideology” [24]. On June twenty first, two thousand sixteen, the
Office of the Press Secretary released an Impact Report entitled 100 Examples of President
Obama’s Leadership in Science, Technology, and Innovation. It detailed specific examples that
the White House felt showed the president’s attitude towards science and technology and their
innovation. In this, “policy” is mentioned a few times, but with very few specific instances of
policies actually controlling or changing scientific innovation. Many policies seem to be aimed
towards education, minorities, immigration, and training, which is expected from Obama’s
Democratic White House. Twelve of these one hundred examples are classified as “engaging in
the world and ensuring national security” [24], which would be the most relating to the context
of this paper. These twelve deal with open government partnerships, strengthened international
cooperation, deployment of scientists for diplomacy, and enhancing biosafety. In October two
thousand and fifteen, the Obama Administration released recommendations for action aimed at
ensuring adequate measures to prevent the misuse of biological material [24].
To summarize the ideas presented in the times of the Obama Administration, in two
thousand thirteen, Obama recommended that the United States Senate act in regards to CBRNE
use in Syria, and in two thousand fifteen, his Administration released recommendations to work
towards better biosecurity in the United States. Both instances dealt with CBRNE safety. Both
instances dealt with the safety of human lives. Both instances resulted in recommendations from
the Obama White House.
According to CBS News, Russia launched its full invasion of Ukraine early in the
morning on February twenty fourth, two thousand twenty two, when one hundred missiles were
fired on Ukraine, as well as three main ground invasions [25]. As the War in Ukraine rages on, to
this day, Russia has not employed chemical weapons, though many sources believe the country
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will. The destruction of a Ukrainian farm was thought to have been a chemical weapon (only to
be proved as the explosion of a facility housing ammonium nitrate) [26].
On March Eleventh, two thousand twenty two, CNN reported on the Biden
Administration’s attitude towards Russia’s use of CBRNE defense in Ukraine. President Biden
famously announced that “Russia [would] pay a severe price if they use chemicals” [27].
Additionally in the report, press secretary Jen Psaki declined to speculate if there was, at the
time, a significant sign of the nearing possibility of the use of CBRNE in Ukraine, though she
was quoted as saying, “they have a large biological and chemical weapons program. So it’s a
pattern, but they also have the capacity” [27].
As of March Sixteenth, two thousand twenty two, the Biden Administration had given a
total of two billion dollars in assistance to Ukraine in their fight against Russia, including an
eight hundred million dollar security assistance package. This package included thousands of
weapons, defense systems, aircrafts, and protective equipment [28].
In two thousand twenty one, President Biden announced a three hundred twenty five
billion dollar research and innovation plan as part of his over two trillion dollar infrastructure
investment proposal. Biden specified that the plan was to “boost America’s innovative edge in
markets where global leadership is up for grabs – markets like battery technology, biotechnology,
computer chips, clean energy, the competition with China in particular” [29].
The Biden Administration has given millions of dollars to support Ukraine. In regards to
biotechnology innovation, President Biden proposed billions of dollars to be spent on research
and development. In contrast to the Obama Administration’s actions, described above, the Biden
Administration threw a lot of money at CBRNE defense abroad, and also at biotech innovation.
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Biotechnology Policies

As originally stated, the goal of this analysis is to determine if CBRNE policies are
similar to other biological and chemical technology policies and how the innovation of both
entities are similar or different. To explore this further, it’s important to look at current
biotechnology policies and procedures in the United States and compare them to what has
already been noted about CBRNE above. The first important idea to note from research is that
specific policies on biotechnology are difficult to come by, as the government seems to provide
limited examples in which it has created a law regarding biotechnology innovation. Much of the
policies here seem to be procedural based.
One such policy is the United States Food and Drug Administration’s 510(k) procedures
regarding medical devices. Medical devices can be classified here as biological innovations. The
FDA requires that device manufacturers must send in their intent to market a device to the FDA
at least ninety days prior, which is known as Premarket Notification, or 510(k) [30]. This policy
is controversial in the biomedical community, as it allows for medical devices to forego a
detailed FDA approval process. If the medical device is similar to an already existing device, the
product can forego Premarket Approval from the FDA [31]. This has been beneficial to many
medical devices such as joint replacements.
Whereas Operation Warp Speed looked to expedite the approval process for COVID-19
vaccines, the FDA’s 510(k) process also looks to expedite the approval process for medical
devices. Where this connection became pertinent is during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the
FDA also used the 510(k) approval process with the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to
make ventilators more readily available [32]. This is an example of a time when CBRNE policy
and biotechnology policy not only allowed for similar outcomes, but were used in the same
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manner. Both Operation Warp Speed and the FDA’s 510(k) process provided similar outcomes
and were used during the COVID-19 Pandemic.
National Strategy for CBRNE Standards

The Department of Homeland Security and Commerce, housed under the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, currently operates by guidelines set in their National
Strategy for CBRNE Standards. This National Strategy describes the federal goals and vision for
prioritization, establishment, coordination and implementation of CBRNE equipment standards
in order to protect workers from attack. The Strategy concludes that certain goals must be
achieved in order to ensure proper safety standards for Americans that work with CBRNE
equipment. In creating this strategy, the government recognized current gaps existing in
standards and policies, and aimed to facilitate growth and change in the CBRNE community
[33].
Released in two thousand eleven by the Subcommittee on Standards, the strategy set forth
had a goal of achievement by twenty twenty. The six goals outlined in the thirty-two page
document were as follows: 1) establish an interagency group for CBRNE standards to promote
coordination across all levels of government, 2) facilitate development of CBRNE equipment
performance standards and use of standards, 3) facilitate use of interoperability standards for
CBRNE equipment, 4) promote long-term standardization procedures to improve response and
readiness, 5) establish voluntary CBRNE training and certification standards that promote
policies, 6) establish CBRNE equipment test and evaluation [34]. To summarize, the overall
goal here was to mitigate risks related to workplace CBRNE and overall safety of the American
public to which it affects.
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In response to this strategy and to begin work to achieve these goals, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Office of Law Enforcement Standards
(OLES), housed under the U.S. Department of Commerce, hosted a convergence meeting at
which a plan was set in place to meet the six goals outlined above, with special emphasis given
to Goal Five: CBRNE Training and Certification Standards. At this meeting, it was determined
that with this strategy plan in place, there were three projected outcomes: 1) greater confidence
in user understanding and use, 2) increased capabilities in responding to CBRNE incidents, 3)
established framework to be maintained and continued. It was also concluded that training
standards were to include separate capability levels, preparedness procedures, and learning
modules. An extensive list of sample response and recovery standards were published, and
federal agencies were called upon to be held responsible for CBRNE operational leadership [35].
This policy was created by the mechanism of the Linear Model proposed by Meier in
nineteen ninety-one. This model of policymaking suggests that the policy is made in four stages:
policy actors make predictions about issues to be addressed, a policy choice is made, the policy
is then implemented, and the outcome is observed [36]. This can be said regarding the National
Strategy for CBRNE Standards, as the Subcommittee on Standards identified an issue of CBRNE
workplace safety, developed a policy, implemented the policy, and therefore expected an
outcome to ensue. The policy was implemented in a relatively straightforward way that would fit
into this Linear Model of Policymaking.
Analytical Results

Results of the case studies are summarized in the tables below. These tables were then
translated into graphs, which are used to show that, of the thirteen cases studied, the majority of
the policies/reactions were affected by foreign affairs. To get to the root of the hypothesis and
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questions proposed, an analysis was also done comparing the effects of foreign nations on
CBRNE and technological innovation policies. It is seen here that, of the cases studied, both
types of policies were affected by foreign affairs about 66.6% or ⅔ of the time.

Table 4: Case Study Results Summary, by year of occurrence, for CBRNE Policies
Policy or
Government
Response

Summary of
Policy or
Response

Year

Affected
by
Foreign
Affairs

Paired Event
or Reasoning

Government
Agency

Proactive or
Not
Proactive
Relative to
Event

Change in
Strategy from
Deterrence to
Prevention

An experiment
at Dugway
Proving Ground
in which a
simulation led to
a brucella
outbreak, led
Eisenhower to
change CBRNE
strategy from
deterrence to
prevention to
avoid another
accidental
infection

1956

No

Infection of
soldiers at
Dugway
Proving
Ground

Eisenhower
Administration

Not
Proactive

Policy for US
to be prepared
to use
bioweapons
offensively

Biodefense
policy for the
United States to
be prepared to
use bioweapons
in a manner that
was
advantageous

1956

Yes

Cold War Era

Eisenhower
Administration

Proactive

Executive
Order 11490

Tasked the
Secretary of
Health and
Education
Welfare with the
responsibility of
developing
chemical and
biological
defenses for the
United States

1969

Yes

Cold War Era

Secretary of
Health and
Education
Welfare

Proactive
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Policy
Method,
if any

Review of
Anthrax Leak
at Dugway
Proving
Ground

Review
conducted by the
Pentagon, which
concluded that
the problems at
Dugway were
procedural and
insufficient
testing was done
on anthrax
samples

2010s

No

Release of
Live Anthrax
at Dugway
Proving
Ground

Pentagon

Not
Proactive

National
Strategy for
CBRNE
Standards

Describes the
federal goals and
vision for
prioritization,
establishment,
coordination and
implementation
of CBRNE
equipment
standards in
order to prevent
employees from
attack

2011

No

Growth and
Change in the
United States,
Protection of
CBRNE
Workers

Department of
Homeland
Security and
Commerce,
White House
Office of
Science and
Technology
Policy,
Subcommittee
on Standards

Proactive

Obama’s
Reaction to
Syrian
Chemical
Weapon Use

Obama
addressed the
American
people in a
speech, said that
the use of
chemical
weapons would
not be tolerated;
also urged
Congress to take
military action
in Syria which,
did not happen

2013

Yes

Chemical
Weapon Use in
Syria

Obama
Administration

Not
Proactive

Biden’s
Reaction to
Russia’s
Invasion of
Ukraine

Biden addressed
Americans in a
speech in which
he condemned
Russia’s
potential
chemical
weapon use;
gave two billion
dollars in
assistance to
Ukraine

2022

Yes

Russian
Invasion of
Ukraine

Biden
Administration

Not
Proactive

30

Linear
Model

Table 5: Case Study Results Summary, by year of occurrence, for Technological Innovation
Policies
Policy or
Government
Response

Summary of
Policy or
Response

Year

Affected
by
Foreign
Affairs

Paired Event
or Reasoning

Government
Agency

Proactive or
Not
Proactive in
Relation to
Event

Policy
Method,
if any

Coordinated
Framework for
the Regulation
of
Biotechnology

Meant to
ensure a
consistent
Federal
Government
approach to
biotechnology
and a
reformulated
approach to the
1984
framework

1986

No

In Response to
Public Concern
of FDA

Office of
Science and
Technology
Policy, Reagan
Administration

Not
Proactive

Linear
Model

510(k)
Premarket
Notification
Device
Approval
Procedure

Premarket
approval
process that
allows for
medical devices
to be classified
as biological
innovations; if
the medical
device is
substantially
similar to an
already existing
device, it can
forego
Premarket
Approval from
the FDA

1997

No

For Medical
Device
Approval in
the United
States

US Food and
Drug
Administration

Not
Proactive

100 Examples
of President
Obama’s
Leadership in
Science,
Technology,
and Innovation

Impact Report
that detailed
specific
examples that
the White
House felt
showed the
president’s
attitude towards
science and
technological
innovations

2016

Yes and
No

Technological
Innovation
Global
Competition
and Protection

Obama
Administration

Proactive
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Biden’s
Research and
Innovation Plan

A three
hundred twenty
five billion
dollar research
and innovation
plan as part of a
two trillion
dollar
infrastructure
investment
proposal to
push America’s
innovation in
competition
with China

2021

Yes and
No

Technological
Innovation
Global
Competition
and Protection

Biden
Administration

Proactive

Table 6: Case Study Results Summary, by year of occurrence, for Both CBRNE and
Technological Innovation Policies
Policy or
Government
Response

Summary of
Policy or
Response

Year

Affected by
Foreign
Affairs

Paired
Event or
Reasoning

Government
Agency

Proactive or
Not
Proactive in
Relation to
Event

Policy
Method,
if any

Operation
Warp Speed

Aimed to
deliver millions
of doses of
vaccine for
COVID-19 to
Americans
while
accelerating the
development of
other
COVID-19
equipment

2020

Yes (global
pandemic)
and No
(made by
US for US)

COVID-19
Pandemic

Trump
Administration,
Department of
Health and
Human
Services,
Department of
Defense

Not
Proactive

Policy
Stream

510(k)
Approval
Procedure for
Use with
Emergency
Use
Authorization
during
COVID-19
Pandemic

Allowed for
FDA to make
ventilators
more readily
available
during
COVID-19
Pandemic

2020,
2021

Yes (global
pandemic)
and No
(made by
US for US)

COVID-19
Pandemic

US Food and
Drug
Administration

Proactive

32

Table 7: Foreign Affairs Influence by Case Type
Case Type

Percent of Cases

CBRNE Only Type

4 of 7 (57%)

CBRNE and Technological Innovation

2 of 2 (100%)

Technological Innovation

2 of 4 (50%)

Table 8: Proactivity by Case Type
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Case Type

Percent of Cases

CBRNE Only

3 of 7 (43%)

CBRNE and Technological Innovation

1 of 2 (50%)

Technological Innovation Only

2 of 4 (50%)

Figure 3: Results of CBRNE versus Non-CBRNE Policies/Actions Influenced by Foreign Affairs
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Figure 4: Results of CBRNE versus Non-CBRNE Policies/Actions Proactivity
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Figure 5: Results of CBRNE versus Non-CBRNE Policies/Actions following Policy Models

Discussion
Overall, this thesis aims to make connections between CBRNE events, policies, and
innovation of other biological technologies. Understanding how policy fits into CBRNE use and
safety is critical for understanding the past, present, and future of CBRNE and humanity. These
ideas were first addressed with a literature review of existing CBRNE policies, including the
Geneva Protocol. Next, Kingdon’s policy models were examined and it was seen that in some
examples, CBRNE defense and bioinnovation policies were created with similar processes. The
study also revealed that in other examples, CBRNE defense and bioinnovation policies were not
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created in similar ways, specifically with policy windows. A case study of Dugway Proving
Ground was done to show attitudes towards CBRNE events within the United States, and
comparisons were made between Obama’s and Biden’s responses to CBRNE threats abroad.
Operation Warp Speed, the FDA’s 510(k) program, the COVID-19 Pandemic response, and
CBRNE protection strategies were also reviewed to show how CBRNE policies are made
without regard to external factors or foreign nations. These findings were then summarized into
tables and graphs to create a comparison analysis.
As seen in Figures 3, 4 and 5, of the cases studied, the CBRNE policies are affected by
foreign affairs a majority of the time. The analysis also shows that, of the cases studied, the
majority of CBRNE policies/actions are reactive in nature, as they are implemented after the
related event takes place. A secondary finding of the analysis done for this thesis is that there is a
difference between United States attitudes towards CBRNE events abroad and at home. This is
seen in comparing the events at Dugway Proving Ground with the Presidential Administrations’
responses in regards to Syria and Ukraine. The implications of these key findings are noteworthy,
as they answer the questions of how and why CBRNE policies are created and implemented.
With this knowledge, it is hoped that this industry may take a more proactive approach in trying
to protect citizens with policy.
As with most research, limitations did become apparent here, with the first being subject
matter experts. Though many databases and policy/history/data sourcing experts were consulted,
it was difficult to find anybody that knew a lot about defense policy or CBRNE in general. Even
consulting with active duty, retired, and civilian military working in biology, many people that
were spoken with had little knowledge on the subject. Therefore, much of the research conducted
was from databases, government documents, and historical artifacts. Another, perhaps obvious,
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limitation, was the lack of ability to obtain government records and data. CBRNE can be seen as
a dangerous and rather classified area of defense, and therefore not much information is available
to the general public. A third, also obvious, limitation is the scope of the research done. Only
thirteen cases were studied, and though this is significant, it does lead to decreased robustness of
the conclusions and therefore, more research should be done using the analysis described above.
Only a few specific non-CBRNE policies were examined, and this could be an area of
further recommended research. The research done here was restricted to modern administrations
and policies in order to control scope. It is recognized that more research and connections need
to be made here to fully interpret the events and further conclude the hypothesis made.
Conclusion
Topics relating to CBRNE policies and attitudes are typically not studied and generalities
and conclusions are difficult to discover upon by research. This thesis aims to give results to case
studies analyzing how the United States responds to the use of CBRNE at home and abroad. This
was seen in research on United States military bases, as well as different federal administrations’
responses to CBRNE use abroad. From this research, it can be learned that CBRNE policies in
response to events are hard to come by, but the government is often seen with a perceived
element of urgency towards the situation. As earlier proposed, there is clearly a stigma with
using CBRNE innovation versus biological and chemical innovation for other areas.
This work has significant value, as it can be applied to other levels of government, other
nations, and other specific CBRNE events. While conducting research, it became quite apparent
that there were not many who had explored specifically the area of CBRNE policies.
Universities, professors, military personnel and various databases were consulted and very little
about the relationship between CBRNE and policy was discovered. Therefore, the ideas
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expressed in this thesis could be used for further research into if this argument can be rightfully
applied to other areas of government in the United States (state, local, etc.), other nations, or
other specific CBRNE events. It can also be used to predict how CBRNE defense policy may
adapt or change in the future.
This research had policy relevance as it shows ways of policy making applied to CBRNE
events throughout history and where these processes fall short. Whereas the Geneva Protocol
gives a good example of where policy making has been specific in CBRNE, the incidents at
Dugway Proving Ground give a good example of where they may lack in the United States. The
examples of attitudes given in the Obama and Biden Administrations also show that there may
not be clear policies set in place to defend against CBRNE threats abroad.
It is from the research conducted here that a relationship between CBRNE defense policy,
attitudes regarding the topic home and abroad, non-proactiveness versus proactiveness, and
policies relating to other biotech innovations can be made. As stated, there are limitations to the
research, but as this study has not been thoroughly conducted before, that can be expected. In the
future, this research can be used to study the future of CBRNE policy and CBRNE events in
retrospect. This research can also be used to study CBRNE on different scopes, such as with an
increased timeline or within other nations or entities.
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